The first five-year plan in the USSR began. "five-year plan" in the USSR

Stalin's industrialization of the late 1920s - 30s was traditionally considered by Soviet historiography (as well as Soviet propaganda) as a way to raise the economy of the USSR to a global level. It was a deliberate wrong.

Under normal conditions, the growth of the economy is accompanied by the development of trade, entertainment infrastructure, growth of folk consumption and increased living standards. And the industrialization of the national economy means primarily the industrialization of the production of consumer goods.

In the USSR, everything was the opposite. A sharp increase in productive forces was accompanied by the liquidation of trade, a sharp decline in the production of consumer goods, a decrease in consumption itself to a minimum level and, respectively, a catastrophic drop in the standard of living of the population.

The first options for the plans of the first five-year plan were developed in parallel in the EMD (for state industry) And in the USSR states (for the entire national economy) since 1926. The first five-year plan was approved in May 1929 on the V Congress of Soviets. There are six or seven of them in total.

During these four years, the state regime change and the change of state economic principles occurred in the USSR.

Installed after the death of Lenin dictatorship Politburo, whose members were not united in views on the future economic Policy Governments, replaced by the sole dictature of Stalin.

Lenin's continued and development of Lenin's "new economic policy", which was defended by the Politburo in most "Right Communists", was replaced by the Stalinist Installation on the Elimination of NEP, the introduction of universal forced labor and the concentration of all resources for the construction of a heavy industry was not calculated to ensure the population with the life benefits.

The first five-year plan plans developed by NEP supporters proceeded from the uniform and interconnected growth of agriculture and industry, mutually providing each other with the necessary means. And, as a result, from the gradual growth of the standard of living of the population.

The five-year plan plan approved in 1929 has already lost all connection with any meaningful economic calculations. He combined unnaturally high policy planning indicators of industry growth, which had to do at any cost, and obviously not designed for execution, purely fictitious fiction indicators of productivity growth, folk consumption, housing construction, etc. The first completely excluded the second. The implementation of the Stalinist plans of industrial production could be carried out only at the expense of the population. It was clear to all developers of five-year plans.

The first authors of the five-year plans were convicted on the "Menshevik process" in 1931. The survivors lived in accordance with the aphorism attributed to Stanislav Stanimilin, which at the initial stage was led by the development of five-year plans in the USSR states: "It is better to stand for high rates than sitting for low."

1. General results of the first five-year period

As far as the results of the first five-year plan did not correspond not only to the first five-year-old options in 1927-28, but also the officially approved project of 1929, it can be judged by the results of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the SSR, released in 1933.

Of course, the statistical data of this time should be treated with extreme caution: the fact that they generally falsified, no doubt. At the same time, even by unreliable data, guessing that it was precisely and for what purpose was falsified, you can understand the meaning of the economic and social processes in the USSR.

Officially, the first five-year plan was completed four from the quarter of the year. The optimal option approved in 1929 was assumed particularly favorable economic development conditions and "... emanated from a smaller specific gravity of defense expenditures in the national economy compared to the starting option. However, during the fulfillment of the five-year plan, due to the increased military danger, the USSR was forced to increase its defense capability for the last year of the five-year plan to increase the defense program.<…> ... Particularly favorable conditions that should have been on the five-year plan to ensure the fulfillment of the optimal version of five years, not only absent, but more of that, instead, we had additional difficulties. And yet the plan is made and moreover, in terms of time, which was a stunning surprise for the enemies of the USSR. "

Military danger did not intensify at all in 1932. In any case, not by the Western neighbors in relation to the USSR, unless the opposite.

It is safe to say that, increasing the pace of industrialization, Stalin built the economy of mobilization type, the meaning of which was the creation of the military industry and, as a result, the most large and efficient army. All other sectors of the economy played a subordinate role and served a heavy and military industry.

As the American researcher, Alec Nove, wrote in 1989, "There are assumptions that military psychosis has been discharged consciously as an instrument of an internity struggle, since, of course, the Soviet Union felt a threat from the capitalist environment. But there is another explanation. Many years ago, the Polish economist Oscar Lange described the Soviet centralized system as the "military economy of a special type". There is logic and psychology of wartime, and they are not related to the ideology. For example, in the UK in 1943, the market balance was violated, the prices did not express consumer value, the currency was non-convertible, the bureaucrats distributed raw materials and materials. All this was, as there were bureaucratic perversions of all kinds. However, it was believed that these were the inevitable and necessary costs of wartime. Of course, at the end of the 20s of the war, it was not, but the "military" psychology was and consciously imposed: the tightening of the class struggle, everywhere "fronts", "bridgeheads", "assault" ... ".

But in the plans of the first five-year plan, as well as in its official outcome, there is no data on the defense costs. There is only the Count "Management and Defense", in which the costs of the state apparatus are combined with defense and not differentiated.

In numbers, the increase in costs for these purposes is as follows. In 1927/28, 1.2 billion rubles were spent on management and defense, which was 23.7% of all budget spending (5.06 billion rubles).

In 1932, 1.84 billion rubles passed on this column. constituting 6.1% of all expenses (30.16 billion rubles). In just 4.25 years, 6.95 billion rubles were spent for these purposes, 9.7% of all budget costs for the five-year plan, which were 71.96 billion rubles. Thus, officially, the costs of the apparatus and defense increased by 1932, just a half times, decreasing the times in one time percentage of 3.9 times.

The population of the USSR in 1932 amounted to 165.7 million people, having increased from 1928 by 11.5 million people. The urban population was 38.7 million, rural - 127 million. The urban population increased from 1928 to 11.1 million people, rural - by 0.4 million people. .

The population occupied in agriculture decreased in general from 119.9 million people. up to 117.2 million people.

These data reflect intensive violent pumping rural population In cities, more precisely, on the construction of the five-year plan. According to Ginzburg plan, which proceeded from natural migration to the city from the village, urban population It should have grown only to 30.1 million people, that is, to be 8.6 million people less.

The rural population is numerically for the five-year period almost did not increase, and the population engaged in agriculture decreased by 2.7 million. This speaks about the colossal seizures of the population from the collective farms.

The collective farm population, which was in 1928, two million people, rose to 66.7 million people. (Growth - 3300%).

The proportion of collective farmers in the agricultural population increased from 1.7% to 61.6%.

The number of state farms increased by 1932 from 3125 to 10 203. The number of working in them increased from 345, 5 thousand to 1046.6 thousand people.

The number of collective farms has grown from 33.3 thousand in 1928 to 209.6 thousand in 1932 (620.4% of growth). The number of collective farms increased from 416.7 thousand to 14 707.7 thousand (3529.4% growth).

The increase in the number of collective farms was 38 times and state farms tried the actual expropriation of personal ownership among the absolute majority of the rural population and the subordination of its former owners directly politburo as a subanemic workers. The capacity of the collective farms was much lower than that of personal farms, but much more important was the possibility without special troubles And without having to negotiate with each individual farmer withdrawn the entire produced product in the property of the state and freely manipulate the workforce by moving it into the right quantities where it was currently required.

Capital investments in Nar. The farm for the five-year period amounted to 60 billion rubles. (in prices acc. years), while in the public sector - 52.5 billion and in private - 7.5 billion.

Including investments in the publicized industry sector amounted to 24.8 billion rubles, agriculture - 10.8 billion rubles. .

Gross products of the entire valuable industry amounted to 34.3 billion rubles in 1932. In terms of 36.6 billion (execution of 93.7%).

For comparison, on the "Streaming Plan" investment in the national economy was planned for five years in 17.6 billion rubles, 4.95 billion rubles, in agriculture - 1.2-1.3 billion rubles. . Gross manufacturing industries planned according to Ginzburg plan in 1932 in the amount of 20.4 billion rubles.

The total number of workers and employees increased from 1928 to 1932 from 11.599 million people to 22, 804 million people. (Planned digit in five-year plan - 15.763 million people, according to Plan, Ginzburg - 12.86 million). Growth - 196.6%.

Including industry - from 4.534 million to 6.781 million (according to plan - 4.602 million people). Growth - 191.9%.

The Czensic Industry - from 3.126 million to 6.311 million people. (plan - 4.08 million people). Growth 201.9%.

In construction, the number of workers and employees increased from 723 thousand people (1928) to 3125.6 thousand people. (according to the five-year plan plan - 1882.5 thousand people). According to the five-year plan plan, the number of workers in construction in 1932 should be 166% by 1928, and amounted to 432.3%.

These numbers give an idea of \u200b\u200bthe scale of violent pumping of the workforce from the village and how it was used. The total number of hired labor has increased by 11 million people. For five years, 10 million more than was supposed according to the Ginzburg plan, and 7 million more than according to the approved plan of 1929

The average monthly salary in the industry has grown from 70.24 rubles. in 1928 to 116.62 rubles. In 1932 (66% growth).

The annual salary of the proletariat has grown from 703.4 rubles. up to 1432 rubles. (Height 103%). The entire average salary over the years of the five-year period has almost doubled, exceeding the marks of the five-year plan (for 1932/33) by 44%.

At the same time, the growth of the nominal salary was ahead of the growth of labor productivity and much lagged behind the increase in prices, which will be discussed below.

The financial plan of the five-year plan was made by 131.1%. According to the plan, income and expenses for five years had to be 91.6 billion rubles., And amounted to 120 billion in four from the quarter of the year. Of these, the incomes of the common sector amounted to 89.9 billion rubles. (74.9% to the result). According to the five-year plan, they were supposed to be 70.9 billion rubles. (77.4% to the result). The five-year plan was exceeded by 126.8%.

According to the Strumlin plan, emanating from the continuation of the NEP, the five-year financial plan was to be 39.68 billion rubles, and was three times more in reality. It is clear that the remaining 80 billion rubles (and in reality and more, since the NEP mechanisms have ceased to act), were squeezed from the population with different off-economic methods.

Very Skupo lit in the "Five-year-old output results" results housing construction. In total, 22,264 thousand square meters were commissioned during the first five-year period. m residential area. Another 5 million must be handed over in early 1933.

The total residential foundation in the cities in 1928, 162.46 million square meters. m, grew by 1932 to 185.6 million square meters. m.

The investment of the common sector in the hillust is 4 billion rubles. .

No data on what was represented by the built living area - which part of it was temporary housing, and which normal, corresponding to sanitary standards, which part was the apartment, and which dormitory - in the "results ..." is not presented. Just as there are no data on the shower rate of living space.

If proceed from the above data, then by 38.7 million urban population in 1932 accounted for 185.6 million square meters. m. That is, the shower rate fell from 5.6 square meters. m in 1928 to 4.8 square meters. m in 1932 instead of growing up to 6.9 square meters. m on the start and up to 7.3 square meters. m on the optimal (approved) five-year plan plan.

According to the 1934 Statistical Yearbook, on January 1, 1933, the urban population of the USSR was 38,739 thousand people. , and the hillfund in the cities of the USSR 1933 - 191.5 million square meters. m. Hence the shower rate - 4.94 square meters. m.

Most likely, data on urban population is more or less correct, and data on the built housing is overestimated. Just as housing financing data are overestimated. In any case, the real position with housing in the cities of the USSR, especially in new industrial cities, was much worse.

It turns out that the urban population according to official data increased in a five-year plan by 12.423 million people. (27.316 million in early 1929 and 39.739 million in early 1933). The living area rose by 23 million square meters during this time. Consequently, on one new city resident for the five-year period, an average of 1.85 square meters was built. m residential area. Approximately so much and accounted for in 1931-32 by one resident of new industrial cities that did not have an old residential foundation and, therefore, devoid of compaction.

For example, in Chelyabinsk, where a giant tractor plant was built, the average shower rate in 1933 was 2.2 square meters. m, in Perm - 2.8 square meters. m. In Magnitogorsk, built in a pure field - 1.6 square meters. m, and in Sverdlovsk, who possessed the old Fund, is 4.2 square meters. m (in 1928 - 5.3 square meters. m).

However, however, how about the results of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the SSR Union 1933 is different from the publications of the first five-year plans, especially the first, 1927.

Statistics in it is extremely buying, rough and unroven. Data on the implementation of production plans are given in monetary terms. What and in what quantity was produced, in most cases it is unclear.

As economic achievements, the amount of capital investments is considered, the growth in the share of the sector in industry and agriculture, the growth of the urban population and the relative decrease in rural, the growth of the specific gravity of the production of means of production. That is, such circumstances that the state of the economy and the level of welfare of the population are not characterized in any way. Either characterize in a negative sense.

The growth in capital investments, carried out by reducing the level of consumption of the population, unequivocally indicates a decrease in the standard of living and strengthening the operation of the population.

The growth of the share of the common sector in the industry and in agriculture is a drop in labor productivity, degradation of small industries, crafts, trade, the fall in the production of consumer goods.

Unnaturally rapid growth of the urban population as descending the population of the rural indicates the forced nature of this process, which has become possible only due to terror in the village - "delaping", deportation and artificially organized hunger as a result of total food seizure of the village.

The growth in the specific weight of the production of means could indicate the growth of the economy as a whole and on the growth of welfare only if it were about the production of funds for the production of folk consumption products. Or any products that bring income to the manufacturer. But at the same time, the trading network should be developed inevitably. In the USSR, the opposite occurred: private trade was completely destroyed, and the market is replaced by the system of state distribution.

In the "results ..." there are no data on what the goods actually and in what quantity were made (or were to be produced) as a result of a giant production of production of production, mechanical engineering, electricity production, black and non-ferrous metals, oil and coal production.

As agricultural achievements, it is indicated that the size of the sowing of state farms and collective farms, the number of villages received by various cars, the overall growth of crops ... No, however, no data on agricultural production and the consumption of agricultural products, including food products.

There are data on trade, but very stingy. And there is no data on foreign trade, except general Information On the no-fulfillment of the export-import plan, in connection with political complications from England and the United States and the "slanderous company about" forced labor "in the USSR."

Let's say, in the chapter "Commodity turn" there is evidence that "state billets of grain bread increased from 12.1 million tons in 1928/29 to 23 million tons in 1931/32, that is, almost 2 times." But in the chapter "Agriculture" there are no data on the overall production of grain and yield dynamics. Instead, they are abundant data on the growth of agricultural settlement in percentage by 1928

No about the data on the shallow and handicraft industry.

The head "Consumption" is generally absent.

There is no data on the situation with housing and changing the shower rate.

This essay was issued by the USSR stateless, but Glav 1933 represents something completely different than five years ago. The goals and ways of work of Soviet economists have changed.

Accordingly, the results changed.

It is interesting to compare the official results of the first five-year plan with the options for its planning at the beginning of the Stalin Era, in 1927, which proceeded from the continuation of the NEP, a balanced growth of industry, agriculture and well-being of the population.

From comparing the data it is clear that the budget of the national economy has officially increased from 13 million rubles. In 1928/29 to 44.6 billion in 1932. In total, 120 billion rubles were invested for an incomplete five-year apartment. While according to the calculations of the five-year plan of the end, all accumulations for five years had to be 12.8 billion rubles, and with loans, seizures from the budget and emissions - 18,250 billion rubles.

It is impossible to explain the origin of these funds otherwise than the violent repayment of them from the population is impossible. Own means for the purposes of accelerated industrialization, the state has not yet located. No matter how the necessary number of workers' hands has not yet been.

During the first five-year plan, there is a pathologically sharp growth of the so-called. "Urban population", the number of facial labor, workers in the state industry and construction, much superior indicators of the planned natural migration of the rural population in the city. At the same time, the same pathologically sharp relative reduction in the rural population in general and population occupied in agriculture occurs.

The means of pumping out funds and pumping of the population from the village on construction sites held at this time with exceptional cruelty social reforms - collectivization of agriculture and complete destruction private property on the means of production, that is, the destruction of small industries, crafts, trade, etc.

From the point of view of normal balanced economic development, these reforms were kill. Calculation of the population and a decrease in living standards cannot be a goal economic reforms - Under normal conditions. Forced labor under normal conditions is also ineffective. The Stalinist reforms of the first five-year plan of the Plan led to a decrease in labor productivity, the fall in the well-being of the population, and they themselves were crimes. But without them, in principle, a goal could not be achieved, which put the government.

It is quite obvious that planned indicators of labor productivity growth, the growth of real salary, consumption growth and the showers contained in the approved five-year plan, in no case have been calculated for implementation. They completely contradicted with those indicators, the maximum possible implementation of which the government really demanded, the volume of capital investments, the growth of female labor, the socialization of national economy, etc.

2. Industry

According to the Strumlin Plan, the growth of industrial production was supposed to be 79%. According to the Ginzburg plan, the growth of industrial production in the industry planned by the WEDD, was supposed to be 82.1%.

According to the five-year plan of 1929, "... The physical volume of the products of the entire Cas substantive industry grows according to the calculations of the starting version 2.3 times and according to the calculations of the optimal version 2.6 times, the products of the planned industry grow accordingly according to the options by 135% and 180 %. "

According to Nauma is clear, "over the interval of less than two years between the preparation of the first and final options for the planned figures for the growth of industrial production increased more than twice. Shortly after the adoption of the five-year plan, in resolution XVI Congress of the Party (June-July 1930) for some of the most important industries, further growth of industrial production was provided. The decision of the VI Congress of Soviets (March 8-18, 1931) was worth a worthy completion of the planning of the Soviets (March 8-18, 1931): the approved scheduled tasks of the five-year plan should be fulfilled in four years, and for particularly important industries allocated a period of three years. Thus, the numbers in the tasks of two five-year plans drawn up in the first half of 1927 were increased more than doubled, and in some cases almost tripled. "

As a characteristic moment of the evolution of planning, clear notes the disappearance of data on the planning and production of small industries.

"In 1927, statistical reports still corresponded to reality, so both five-year plans drawn up by the state and voltage and approved in 1927 contained some detail industry data. However, in the first five-year plan, data on the release of small industries are missing, although in general the plan itself was much more detailed than its project developed by the state in 1927 since 1929, information on the release of small industries is missing and in most statistical collections " .

According to the calculations of clear, the planning of small industries looked as follows:

The implementation of the Industrial Production Plan appears as follows: "According to official statistical sources, in four years, from 1928 to 1932, the production of industry increased by 101% (by industry as a whole) and by 132% (by large industries). At the same time, the release of small industries decreased by 2%. For comparison: it was planned to increase production growth by 136% by industry as a whole, by 164% by large and 50% in small industries. "

On the priorities of the Soviet government during the fulfillment of the first five-year plan, the official performance of the production indicators in the first five-year plan gives a good presentation.

Official growth rates in the first five-year plan

Performed (as far as possible), primarily indicators of the production of production tools, most tense. In the second - the entire industry. At the same time, the increase in the production of consumption items, designed extremely insignificant, turned out to be at all negative. That is, the production of consumption items has decreased dramatically.

Despite gigantic construction program The five-year plan, "the production of building wood increased in three years (1930-1933) by 1.5%, and the release of brick and cement fell by 20% and 9.9%, respectively."

This suggests a catastrophic reduction in civil construction in the USSR and on an equally catastrophic drop in its quality.

Obviously, gigantic volumes industrial construction Virtually all scarce construction materials were absorbed - cement, metal, brick ... The share of residential and municipal construction accounted for pitiful remnants. The government constantly issued decrees to limit or complete use of use in civil construction Metal, cement, high-quality wood, on the replacement of short-term building materials by surrogates and to reduce the cost of construction by thinning the walls and the use of low wood.

3. Agriculture

According to a clear data given, "instead of an increase of 55% in the five-year period from 1927/28 to 1932/33, which was provided for by the approved version of the five-year plan, the overall production of agricultural products decreased by 14% at the interval between 1928 and 1933 G.. The release of livestock products has decreased by 48% instead of planned growth by 50-54%. This means that the five-year plan for these indicators was performed a little more than a third<…> In 1928, a slight increase was observed in agricultural production (3%). After approval of the first five-year plan in 1928, an annual decline in both the total output of agricultural products and the production of livestock production was observed, and even more<…> in last years The first five-year period of millions of people died of hunger. Hunger continued during the second five-year plan. "

Mass hunger in the USSR was due not only to the fall in production and total seizure of food from the collectivizable village, but also to export food abroad. In itself, the fall in food production could not cause such a catastrophe if not export. Export revenue was the main source of currency required for the purchase of industrial modern technology, Equipment for the construction of factories and payment of specialists who installed Western equipment. And the main object of export, along with the forest, was food, first of all - grain.

4 . International trade

The approved five-year plan said:

"A feature of the export plan is the restoration of bread exports. Due to the fact that the material growth of production is designed in even higher rates than exports, our trading ties Regardless will not grow. In relation to gross products of 1932/33, exports will be approximately about 3%, which is close to modern ratios.<…> As for imports, in addition to its great growth, due to the strengthening of the role of agriculture as the raw material base industry, its structure will change towards an increase in equipment importance due to raw materials. This will make the Soviet market especially attractive for the global industry suffering from chronic overproduction. "

The relationship of food exports, import equipment and hunger in the USSR is well illustrated by the data from the dissertation work of Konstantin Trommel, dedicated to the development of Soviet-German trade relations from 1928 to 1936 and protected in Leipzig in 1939.

For the USSR, Germany was since 1928 the most important trading partner (ahead of England and the USA). Only in 1935, according to the volume of Soviet imports, Germany moved to third place (after the United States and England), but in 1936 it was again on the first.

According to the volume of Soviet exports, Germany was in the first place only in 1928, 1929 and 1934, in the remaining years, the first place was occupied by England.

The maximum volume (in rubles), German imports in the USSR reached in 1931 - 410 million rubles. This was 37.2% of the total Soviet import of 1931 (1.105 billion rubles). Next year, imports decreased in absolute value to 327.7 million rubles, but increased in a relative to 46.5% (only 704 million rubles).

In total, over the years of the five-year plan (1928-1932), the USSR was imported due to the border of goods by 4.7 billion rubles. , and withdrawal by 4.140 billion rubles. .

Generally international trade USSR for 1928-1933 Looks like this.

The trade in Germany and the USSR for the five-year period looked like this: the main part of the Soviet import was machines and devices, electrical equipment, metal products, cars and parts for them, tractor and agricultural machinery.

From the above tables it can be seen that the maximum exports from the USSR falls in 1929-1930, and the maximum import in the USSR falls at 1930-31. From Germany in the USSR also imported almost exclusively industrial equipment different species and raw materials (eg, wool, rubber). Consumer goods constituted read more.

In 1930, goods were imported to 1.058 billion rubles in the USSR, and 1.030 billion rubles were exported.

For comparison - in a relatively well-safe and twisted 1925, the import was 724 million rubles, and export was 559 million rubles. (For Germany, respectively - 102.7 and 87.4 million rubles).

The absolute maximum import from Germany falls in 1931 - 410 million rubles. The removal from the USSR to Germany this year amounted to 129 million rubles.

The absolute maximum export to Germany - 1929 (251 million rubles).

Imports in the USSR from Germany in 1931 (762 million Reichsmarocks) consisted of 89% of finished products, 9.3% of raw materials and semi-finished products, by 0.9% of food and beverages.

Soviet exports to Germany in 1931 (303.45 million Reichsmarocks) consisted of 27.4% of food, by 63.3% of raw materials and semi-finished products, by 9.3% of the finished products.

In total in 1931, the USSR took out abroad from the total amount of 811 million rubles. Food for 302 million rubles, raw materials and semi-finished products for 418.9 million rubles, finished products by 89.6 million rubles.

In general, exports of food from the USSR for the five-year period looked as follows:

Importing industrial equipment in the USSR has developed as follows:

In total, only industrial equipment for 2236.5 million rubles were imported in the USSR, 47.5% of the total imports.

Here, other goods that have a purely industrial nature are not taken into account - non-ferrous metal products, chemical products, cotton, wool, rubber, etc.

Food exports on individual goods looked like this (million rubles;% of all exports):

For five years, from 1928 to 1932, SSSO exported grains to 458.4 million rubles;

Oils by 120.6 million rubles;

Eggs by 76.2 million rubles;

Fish for 66.6 million rubles;

Sahara by 141.2 million rubles;

Cake by 82 million rubles.

The export dynamics of Soviet food to Germany is visible from the following table (in tons and millions of Reichsmarock).

Import of Soviet food products to Germany

From the above tables it can be seen that the peak of food exports from the USSR as a whole falls at 1930-31-32. It coincides with the peak of imports in the USSR machines and machines, and also coincides (partially preceding him) with a mass hunger of 1932-33. With millions of victims. The maximum import of industrial equipment in the USSR falls in 1931, the maximum of food exports in 1930 is the year of collectivization.

At the same time, the maximum of the export to Germany grain (805,709 tons) and oils (13,438 tons) falls for 1932 - a hunger peak in the Soviet village.

At the same time, by simple calculations, it is possible to find out that grain prices fell from 308 Reichsmarocks per ton in 1928 to 90.8 - in 1932 (3.4 times). Accordingly, oil prices fell during this time from 3010 to 1174 Reichsmarocks per ton (2.6 times). That is, by the end of the five-year plan, the USSR exported food for dumping prices.

In 1929, grain was exported abroad by 23.9 million rubles, and in 1930 (in the height of collectivization) - by 207.1 million rubles, that is, almost 9 times more (in monetary terms). Given the dumping prices for which the USSR sold its products, the difference in quantity should have been even more. Even in the terrible 1933 grains were exported by 46.5 million rubles., Almost as much as in the relatively full of 1925 (51.4 million rubles) and four times more than in 1928 (11, 8 million rubles.).

The five-year plan of 1929 proceeded from "... Doubling tasks for starting and growth more than two and a half times the optimal version of our export<…> By the end of the fifth anniversary, bread exports should grow to 50 or 80 million centners<…> Expansion of exports S.-H. products (oil, eggs, etc.) scheduled with complete account The needs of the domestic market and the tasks of the so-called refurbishment of the consumption structure (the increase in the consumption of eggs, oil, etc.), which should naturally accompany the industrial and cultural growth of the country. "

The following table gives an idea of \u200b\u200bthe ratio of the dynamics of Soviet exports for the five-year plan as a whole, the export of food and the export of grain and legumes in monetary terms according to Tremel.

The table shows that all exports of 1929 exceeded the export of 1928 by 15%, the export of 1930 - by almost 30%, the export of 1931 was almost compared with the export of 1028, and exports of 1932 fell by 28%.

That is, in the first three years of the five-year plan, Soviet exports grow, reaching a maximum in 1930, and then sharply falls, turning out in 1932 below 1928.

At the same time, the export of food as a whole in the second year of the five-year period almost did not increase compared with 1928, in 1930 increased by 60%, in 1931 exceeded the export of 1928 by 40%, and in 1932 amounted to only 66 % of the first year of the five-year plan.

It means that specific gravity Food in general exports increased until 1931 and sharply fell only in 1932, being lower than in 1928

A completely different picture gives the dynamics of the export of bread crops.

In 1929, the income from the export of grain increased compared with the 1928th a little more than twice (202%). In 1930, an increase of 17.5 times (1755%), in 1931 - 13 times (1336%), in 1932 - almost five times (494%) compared to the first year of the five-year plan.

Grain exports sharply increased to 1930, but even fallen in 1931 and 1932, it was many times higher than at the beginning of the five-year plan.

The maximum revenue exports of bread gives in 1930 and 1931. But even in 1932, when mass hunger came, revenue from grain exports was 5 times more than in a relatively prosperous 1928.

Data on the removal of grain in tons is still expressive and show what great importance attached to the politburo grain exports as a source of financing industrialization.

Export of bread crops from the USSR (in tons)

The maximum of the export of bread crops falls in 1931 - 5,182,835 tons (51.8 million centners) and exceeds the export of 1927/28 at 15 times. This is almost the level of planned assumptions 1929 at the end of the five-year plan - "50 or 80 million centners", except for the fact that these achievements led to mass hunger in the country.

For comparison, the export of grain in relatively prosperous years of the NEP was in 1925/26. 2,068,777 tons; In 1926/27 - 2 177 714 tons.

In 1928, revenue from grain exports was only 1.5% of total exports. Oil and eggs were given by 4.9 and 5.2%, respectively. In the following years, the removal of these products fell sharply (in 1930, respectively, 1.1 and 0.4%), but the share of grain rose in 1930 to 25.5% of total exports.

These patterns are easy to explain to collectivization, the height of which falls just in 1930. The production of oil and eggs decreased sharply after the destruction of individual peasant farms and small private industries. The tasks of the collective farms included to produce as much bread as possible, which was practically subdued from the village.

This situation is extremely clearly illustrated and explains the letter of Stalin Molotov in August 1930: Mikoyan reports that the billets grow and every day exporting 1-1.5 million pounds every day. I think this is not enough. Now it is necessary to raise the same (norm) of daily export to 3-4 million puddles at least. Otherwise, we risk staying without our new metallurgical and machine-building (automobile plants, chelyabzavod, etc.) of the plants ... In a word, you need to quickly force the export of bread. "

Deliveries of equipment for plants directly depended on the export of food from the USSR.

Curious data on supplies to Germany Soviet forests.

The table shows a sharp increase in deliveries, reaching a maximum in 1930 - 1.309 million tons, four times more than in 1925 (in the midst of the NEP). At the same time, prices fall sharply, in 1932 - almost twice as compared with the 1928th.

It should be borne in mind that almost the entire plan for forest development was performed with the help of forced labor.

According to the reference book "Control figures for work for 1929-30" In 1927/28, 1.0 million hiking and equestrian workers were involved, in 1928/29. - 1.198 million in 1929/30. It was planned to use 2.307 million hiking and equestrian workers. Another 793 thousand workers were planned to be used for alloy.

Reality looked as follows:

"At the Spring Plenum of the Central Committee<1928 г.> It turned out that it was impossible to fulfill the logging program in 1929 by the former means and methods. At this point, the collectivization began. Responsible for it Commissioner for agriculture pointed out that collectivization would be impossible if, as before, logging in the winter season will be carried out by the racifically recruited masses of peasants with their horses, which, when returning home, not only monstrously decrease among them, but also so exhausted that it is not able to participate in spring work ... according to accepted methods and organization of work, already in 1928 for logging and transportation of forests for four months from November 15 to March 15 was required in total About five million people and two million horses.

These unpredictible masses of people were forcibly sent to the area without roads, and neither the slightest care was not manifested about their placement and provision. "

5 . Consumption

In the first five-year plan approved in 1929, indicators of food consumption of food consumption were laid.

Growth consumption of food according to the five-year plan 1929

As can be seen from the table, in 1932/33, the urban population should have used bread as much as in 1928, to use meat by 12% more than in 1928, eggs - by 71% more, dairy products - on 55% more. The consumption of the rural population should also grow, although not so much.

It is possible to say with full confidence that the planned growth rates of population consumption were a deliberate bluff at the time of the statement of the five-year plan. No one was going to fulfill them, and it was impossible. The government pursued the tasks of the opposite sense - a decrease in consumption to a possible minimum. At the same time, the rural population was in a much worse position than the urban, which is also hungry.

As Elena Osokina writes, "... The state supply system was based on the assumption of the self-sufficiency of the rural population. However, the possibility of self-sufficiency was undermined by all the revolving state billets, which were excluded not only the commodity, but also necessary for the consumption of the villagers themselves. As a result, collective farms remained with small amount money - the procurement prices for collective farms were unprofitable - and with a small margin of product grown, from which it was still to highlight seed and reserve funds. As a result, as the Russian saying says, "the shoemaker was sitting without boots": Harbors did not have in the sufficiency of bread, those who raised cattle did not eat meat, did not drink milk.

Sulling collective farm crust, the state supplied the rural population is scarce and irregularly. Although the rural population in numbers more than three times exceeded urban, during the period of the CAR system, the rural supply was only about a third of the country turnover. The goods became mainly in the third and fourth quarters to stimulate the harvest. In 1931-33, only 30-40% of sewing products, shoes, soaps, knitwear allocated for the supply of rural population. Even worse, the rural population was provided with food. At the specified period, Narkomnab sent more than half of the market fund of vegetable oil to the city of the USSR, about 80% of the funds of flour, cereals, animal oil, fish products, sugar, almost the entire meat products fund (94%), the whole margarine, a third of all state-owned tea and salts .

If we consider that the cities, receiving the lion's share of state funds, were provided extremely not enough, it is clear that the crumbs that remained rural people could not improve his provisions.

Even these data, being averaged, only to weakly characterize the poverty of the state supply of the rural population. The funds sent to the village had a targeted purpose. This means that the goods were not divided into equity between the inhabitants, but to ensure certain populations, primarily political workers, MTS and state farms. By the time of the receipt of goods in Selpo, most of them turned out to be fixed behind certain groups of consumers. "

6. Prices

The most obvious symptoms of the catastrophe, which the first five-year plan was completed, is height consumer prices and reducing trade in consumer goods.

"... during the entire period of the first five-year plan and especially in the last two years five years have observed a huge increase in prices for consumer goods and a sharp drop in the size of the supply of these goods to the network retail. These data are particularly impressive if we consider them per capita of the urban population. According to Malafeev, sales of food through state retailers decreased from 7367 million rubles. in 1930 to 5538 million rubles. In 1932. Throughout the five-year plan, sales of retail products, excluding food, grew, but their growth was only 1.5%, but at the same time the prices on both categories of goods increased by 62.4% between 1930 and the first half of 1932. This meant that in two years, from 1930 to 1932, the actual volume of public trade decreased more than half.

For the same short period, prices in private markets rose by 233%. Already in 1931, in private trading, the rise in prices for retailers was quite high. In the period from 1927/28 to 1930, the rise in prices amounted to 131%, and in the period from 1927/28 to the first half of 1932, an almost eight-round increase in prices was observed. The next essential jump in prices for retail goods fell on the second half of 1932. "

Official data on the results of the first five-year plan (as well as the preparation materials of the approved five-year plan plan with all changes) do not give an answer to the main question - what was its purpose?

It is clear that in the USSR, a huge amount of coal, oil, electricity, metals, machine tools and other intermediate products, intended for the production of something end-in-law was carried out. But this end product has never been mentioned.

Practically no products produced at the enterprises built during the years of the first five-year plan were not exported. They also did not go to the domestic market. Moreover, by 1930, private trading was already destroyed, and the supply of the population with the essential goods took the form of distribution on cards.

In the same way, the initial data was never mentioned, which served as the basis for the calculation of Soviet industrialization. Construction planning about one and a half thousand new enterprises should proceed from the planning of their production end productsWhat exactly could not be just cast iron, steel, electricity and even tractors with cars.

Tractors and cars, data on the planned production of which are given in the two-year-old documents, also not the final product. They are also a means of production, especially since the passenger cars for individuals was not performed at all.

The data on the growth of the production of consumption goods (explicitly shuttles), do not explain all superhuman efforts to build production means of production. Especially since these conditional data concern only state-owned production, the growth of which occurred against the background of the destruction of a private small industry, which, in fact, provided with NEP, the household needs of the population.

During the first five-year plan, the industry was built, production goals which was never covered. Social reforms were held, which were brought to the introduction of universal forced labor. Forced labor - the least productive form of labor. But it is extremely effective when the task is to build something that does not ultimately have a direct economic effect for society and the disadvantageous population. And when the organizer of this construction has no funds and opportunities in order to ensure the construction of funds and free labor.

7. The problem of foreign investment

Characteristic (and amazing, at first glance) feature of the plans of Soviet industrialization is the absence of any mention of the possibility of attracting foreign investors. They are not even in the very first plans of the first five-year plan. Although it would seem foreign investment Could play a key role in the rise of the national economy. The fact that this topic was discussed in government circles is confirmed by the publication in 1929 on foreign languages Multiple books series "Concession objects of the Soviet Union". Among them are accurately present Magnitogorsk Plant, Nadezhdinsky and Taganrog cast iron plants, a Svir Power Station and the Volga-Don Canal.

In the book prof. M.I. Bogolepova "Financial Plan of the Five Year", which is a detailed version of the relevant section approved in 1929 of the five-year plan, indicates the sources of financing of the five-year plan, defined in the amount of 76,800 million rubles. There are no foreign investment among them.

The negative attitude of Stalin to concessions is well known.

Some light on the explanation of this fact shed Memoirs Grigory Conduzovsky, a Soviet diplomat, fled to the West (that is, literally through the wall of the Soviet Institution in Paris) in 1929. For the first time, the memoirs were published in Paris in 1930. The former ESER Conidovsky became the most high-ranking diplomatomat The non-return of the Stalinist era, at the time of flight he performed the responsibilities of the Soviet police station in Paris. Condussky was well aware of internal discussions and contradictions of the Soviet political top. This is how it describes the situation of summer 1928:

"... Inside the country, there was almost no hope that the new outbreak of military communism would be able to meet the new outbreak, even more acute in their appearances and even more unbearable psychologically, since this time the war was on the country's borders, and no enemy was not threatened the peasant.

However, I also cherished the weak hopes for the fact that if I manage to tie Stalin next to concessions in foreign policy and thereby enable the country to receive financial assistance From outside, it will be possible to mitigate Stalin's policies, not bringing things to an open break with the peasantry.

It was clear to me that the pressure on the peasantry grows as a result of the ridiculous line to the fast industrialization of Russia, which was taken by the Government of Stalin. This super-industrialization required for its exercise of enormous means and was to force Stalin, ultimately, to strengthen his pressure on the peasantry to the limits behind which the hunger and the death of millions of people begins.

I perfectly understood that the external policy of Stalin for this period of time will be the derivative of its so-called "general line". But at the same time, in the field of foreign policy, it was possible to put on Stalin much more successful than in the field of internal. The prospect of obtaining a large foreign loan could cause a certain twist of moods among influential members of the Politburo and the immediate Stalinist environment. The party apparatus, led by Molotov, walked unquestionedly for the last, pulling it towards execution in the field of Stalinist directives. But the party apparatus walked to the side reluctantly, fastening the heart, as the difficulties and dangers and dangers of the on-site workers were clear for all party workers who get the new way of acute struggle with the peasantry. That is why the prospect of reviving financial and economic relations with abroad could even reverse the mood of the party apparatus and make it difficult to make it impossible, the Stalinist turning policy against the man. "

Bezazovsky tried to convince members of the Politburo to agree to the payment of France of Russian debt, which could be profitable for the USSR, since he strongly improved the conditions for obtaining loans and released funds for industrialization and opened the USSR wide opportunities in the French market. The report of the conversational Stalin imposed a veto.

According to Interviews, in October 1928 he was called to Stalin, who among other things, said:

"We cannot pay debts without changing the class essence of our power<…> You think that you can set a long-lasting financial cooperation with the capitalist world. But, having surrendered to Poincar, we will lose all the possibility of revolutionary maneuvering that one of the most important positions is to refuse to recognize old debts. We overpay on abnormal loans. You're right. But we keep the full independence of our economic system in its fight against the capitalist environment. It is necessary to be naive to think that we can get in France long-term loans without any conditions. We will put conditions as a result of which we will not be able to keep our farms as we want. We will not lead, and we will lead. Understand that short-term commodity loans for all their high costs save us from political bondage. We do not need large external loans. Rather, we still do not get them on those conditions that we can offer. Think otherwise - it means to fall into disgusting opportunism, present the long-term cooperation of two irreconcilable economic Systems» .

The most important thing in this speech is a fundamental refusal to prospects for foreign loans, since they will inevitably entail external control over the economic use of investments: "We will not be able to lead our farm as we want." Short-term loans are disadvantageous, roads and force to exhaust the national economy, but at the same time soviet government Relighted from any external control.

This method of economic development is beneficial only if the results of industrialization should be kept secret from the outside world, and a military collision is considered inevitable.

Conversational at his own fear and risk tried to negotiate with the Consortium of English banks on financing the Soviet Industrialization in fairly large sizes. Based on the data from the State Data received from the State Data was a general plan for possible British investments and handed over his English side. This plan itself is an undoubted interest as a list of objects that Gosplan theoretically could imagine in the form of investment, that is, capable of bringing income in the future.

Conductive comments: "This plan sinned, of course, schematically and insufficient substantiation of the figures given in it, but mainly he exhausted the content of the work plan of the State Commission. It is clear that in the case of adoption by both parties such a wide plan that has reached the impressive figure of five billion gold rubles (that is, for that time, about ten billion worm rubles, since the Drop Chervonz has already passed a rapid pace), a complete political agreement was needed and Far-coming agreement between both parties. This plan, in the case of his success, was led by a sufficiently solid basis under the five-year plan without the abolition of NEP to create a serious political conflict in the country and jeopardize the existence of Russian agriculture, and therefore the country's economy as a whole. I hoped that this plan could be a fairly reliable platform and for the right side of the Politburo in her desire to reflect the increasingly developed offensive of Stalin against the economic and political system NEP. "

The description of the conversational activities to attract English investments in the USSR is quite confused, but it is clear that she could lead to success, since the English side expressed explicit interest. In the autumn of 1928, the Interviews began to carefully inform the Moscow authorities. The reaction was more than cold. Bezazovsky was ordered to discontinue negotiations, which were completely broken in March 1929. In September 1929, the conversational was called to Moscow, but, knowing the morals of his superiors, preferred to escape.

All this detective story testifies primarily about Stalin's principal reluctance to attract foreign investments in the USSR and not only to put the Soviet economy under the control of potential investors, but in principle to expand the Soviet economic ties that go beyond the trade in the Soviet raw materials and procurement of Western technologies.

Explanation, as it seems to us, there can be only one. Industrialization of industrial production, which Stalin conducted, did not a goal to obtain income from the sale of manufactured products. Moreover, the character of this product itself, as well as its production goals, was a state secret.

Hence the output. The specifics of the methods and methods that Stalin conducted industrialization in the USSR can be explained only by the construction of military industry and, as a result of this, a huge mechanized army. For any other productions of the objectives and objectives of industrialization, other methods that would lead to other results were and should have been used.

Notes

1. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 12.

2. NOVA Alec. About the fate of NEP. Letter to the editors of the magazine "Questions of History". "Questions of history." № 8, 1989. - P. 172-176

3. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 272.

4. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 252.

5. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 252.

6. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 264.

7. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 265.

8. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 253.

9. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 253.

10. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 254.

11. Prospects for the deployment of the USSR national economy at 1926/27 - 1030/31. P. 47.

12. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 179.

13. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 178.

14. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 271.

15. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of the USSR industry 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.635

16. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 186 ..

17. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 186 ..

18. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 186.

19. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353.

20. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. M., 1934, p. 436.

21. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353.

22. A.V. Bakunin, V.A. Tsypulnikov. Urban planning in the Urals during the period of industrialization. Sverdlovsk, 1989, Table. one.

23. Results of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. eleven.

24. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 191.

25. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 271.

26. Prospects for the deployment of the USSR national economy at 1926/27 - 1030/31. P. 29.

27. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 271.

28. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan of development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 271.

29. Prospects for the deployment of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. P. 32-33

30. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., S.551.

31. "Materials for the five-year plan for the development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32", M., p.17

32. Results of the fulfillment of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the SSR Union, M., 1933, p. 253.

33. Materials for the five-year plan of industry development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., P.87.

34. Five-year plan of national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129.

35. Materials for the five-year plan of industry development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., P.89.

36. Five-year plan of People's Economic Construction of the USSR, M., 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129.

37. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 58.

38. Five-year plan of People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70.

39. Five-year plan of People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, part 2, p. 288.

40. Materials for the five-year plan of industry development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.107-108

41. Prospects for the deployment of the national economy of the USSR at 1926/27 - 1030/31. Application, s. 163.

42. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70.

43. Prospects for the deployment of the national economy of the USSR at 1926/27 - 1030/31. Table. Pp. 3 (Cyt. On Clear, P.96)

44. Materials for the five-year plan of industry development of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., P.403

45. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, 83.

46. \u200b\u200bNaum is clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

47. Naum clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 96-97.

48. Naum Clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 99.

49. The USSR industry. Statistical compilation. M.: Statistics, 1957. P. 31. The same indicators are repeated in the book "The National Economy of the USSR in 1958" (P. 135). Indicators for small industry are determined on the basis of common values \u200b\u200bfor industry and data on large-scale. - Approx. N. Clear

50. Naum clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 100.

51. Naum Clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 108.

52. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, Volume 1, 131. - approx. N. Clear

53. The USSR national economy in 1958 is Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, p. 136.

54. Naum Clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 109.

55. The USSR national economy in 1958 is Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, p. 350.

56. Naum clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

57. Five-year plan of national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, part 2, p. 418.

58. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der Deutsch-Sowetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen Seit 1928 Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3A.

59. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der Deutsch-Sowetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen Seit 1928 UNTER Besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

60. TRÖMEL, KONSTANTIN, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER Deutsch-Sowetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen Seit 1928 Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3a.

61. TRÖMEL, KONSTANTIN, Die Entwicklung der Deutsch-Sowetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen Seit 1928 Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

62. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der Deutsch-Sowetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen Seit 1928 Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 8.

63. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

64. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical yearbook. M., 1934, p. 382-383

65. Five-year plan of People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

66. Letters I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. M., 1995, p. 198, 203-205.

67. "Control figures for work for 1929-30 g", M. 1930, p. 89-90.

68. Karl I. Albrecht. "Verratene Sozialismus", Berlin, 1942, p. 67-68.

69. Five-year plan of the People's Economic Construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 106.

70. If in 1927/28, 11.5 million tons of grain were harvested, then by the end of the card system in 1934/35 - more than 26 million tons. (The Economic Transformation of The Soviet Union. P. 290) - Footnote E. Okokina.

71. In 1931, directive bakery prices were about 5-12 kopecks. per kg. At the same time, the cost of one kilogram of wheat flour even at low card prices was 25-28 kopecks, and on the market - 4-5 rubles. In the same year, government procurement prices for beef and lamb were from 17 to 36 kopecks. For a kilogram, on milk - 17 kopecks. per liter. At the same time, the lowest price for meat in trade (card supply in the city) was 1 rub in 1931. 50 kopecks, in 1932 - more than 2 rubles. Commercial and market prices were significantly higher. So, in 1932 the average market price On meat in Moscow there was 11 rubles, jolly - 2 rubles. (Osokina E.A. consumption hierarchy. P. 46). - Footnote E. Okokina

72. Elena Osokina. Behind the facade of the "Stalinsky abundance". Distribution and market in supplying the population during the years of industrialization 1927-1941. Moscow, Rossman, 1999, p. 115-116.

73. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing .... P. 172. - Approx. N. Clear

74. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing .... P. 402. - Approx. N. Clear

75. "This clearly demonstrates the data given by Malafeev (P. 402). If we take the prices of 1927/28 per 100, then the indices of retail prices in the first half of 1932 amounted to: the public sector. 176.6; Private sector - 760.3; General index - 251.8. If we take the prices of 1928 for 100, the retail price index in state and cooperative trade in 1932 amounted to 255 (ibid. P. 407). Thus, the growth of retail prices in the public sector in the second half of 1932 was so great that if, when analyzing the data for the second half of 1932, the price increase index in public and the private sector Apply to the characteristics of the individual public sector» - approx. N. Clear.

76. Naum is clear, Soviet economists of the 20s. Debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 110.111.

77. P.S. Yegorov The Magnitqgorsky (Magnet Mountain) Metallurgical Works Moscow, 1929; Prof. A.S. Axamitny. Die Volga-Don Grosswasserstrasse. Moskau 1929; Sergej Andreevič Kukel'-Kraevskij. Die Swir-WasserkraftAnlage Für Die Elektrizitätsversorgung [!] Des Leingrader Gebiets. Moskau: (UPRAVL. Del. SNK SSR I STO), 1929; Kostrow, I. N. Eisenhüttenwerke in Nadeschdinsk und Taganrog / .. - Moskau :, 1929

Eleventh five years old - Five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR and the corresponding stage of the country's history of the country from January 1, 1981 until December 31, 1985 inclusive. The last of the four full five-year plates of the so-called. "Brezhnev era" in the history of the USSR.

The main task is five-year plan

Main formula economic task The 11th five-year plan - "Give the development of the country even more dynamism due to more effective use Production Funds, their further development and renewal, introducing advanced technologies and achievements of scientific and technological progress, especially in the heavy industry. "

Five hundred features

At the beginning of the five-year plan, the first deputy was appointed. In October 1980, shortly before the death of Kosygin Tikhonov adopted the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Tikhonov led folk economy The entire 11th five-year plan, until October 1985, during this time, 4 Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee was changed: ,.

Stripper XI sign

In the lightweight and food industry, along with the creation of new capacities, the expansion, technical re-equipment of existing enterprises actively was actively conducted. The total length of the main oil and gas pipelines and taps from them reached 54 thousand and 112 thousand kilometers, respectively. In general, for the five-year plan, the national income and the gross social product increased by another 19%.

For the 11th five-year apartment, the increase in the number of industrial workers decreased by two thirds and fell to 2.7% (from 30479 thousand in 1980 to 31302 thousand in 1985, including students). Nevertheless, the continued growth in labor productivity allowed increasing industrial products by 20%, and the national income by 17%. The salary of workers and employees rose at the same time by 13%, and payment of collective farmers by 29%, compiling 190 and 150 rubles, respectively. per month. It should be noted that prices for the overwhelming number of positions of the distribution of retail trade, as well as housing and communal services, transportation and communication until the end of the 1980s remained at 1961-63.

For this five-year period, real per capita incomes increased by 11%, and payments and benefits to the population from public consumption funds increased by 25%. The leading growth of the latter meant that the increasing share of the newly created value was not distributed "", but "according to needs", that is, out of direct dependence on the number and quality of labor costs listed by a particular person in the formation of the mass of goods consumed. Thus, the idea of \u200b\u200bovercoming on the way to communism was not removed from the agenda. However, instead of their immediate cancellation in an ordinary order (than during the Military Communism, it was particularly actively engaged in

The first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928/29 - 1932/33) entered into force on October 1, 1928. By this time, the tasks of the five-year plan were not yet approved. The plan's assertion occurred on the V All-Union Congress of Soviets in May 1929

The main task of the five-year plan was to turn the country from the agrarian-industrial in the industrial. The country's economic and financial condition, its isolated position in the world was sharply called the issue of sources, pace and methods of industrialization. These problems were to resolve the first five-year plan for 1928/29 - 1932/33.

The three main directions of capital mobilization were identified:

• accumulations in the industry itself;
• redistribution through the state budget revenues of other sectors of the national economy;
• use of population savings.

The most important acquisitions of labor productivity and the strictest savings regime were most important.

The five-year plan is based on the idea of \u200b\u200ban optimal combination of heavy and light industry, agriculture. The plan was as noted by economists balanced and real. It was assumed to increase industrial production by 136%, an increase in labor productivity by 110%, construction of 1,200 new plants.

At the end of 1929, scheduled tasks of the first five-year plan were revised on the side of a sharp increase and setting economically unattainable purposes. Stimulating the work activity workers based on this time enthusiastic and administrative levers.

The possibilities of material incentives were limited to the equalization tariff reform of 1928, the introduction of normalized supply in cities.

At the beginning of 1930, new Stalinist directives appeared: 2,000 new plants instead of 1,200, an increase in industrial production three times instead of 136%.

For the purpose of the forced development of the industry, planned indicators were increased by a number of industries - the production of cast iron, oil, etc. The average annual increase in products, for example, in 1931 was raised to 45% instead of 22% of the five-year plan.

Machine was made from the Fund of consumption in the industry. Thus, during the first five-year plan, the share of accumulations, which up to the revolution, not more than 10% of national income increased to about 29% in 1930, 40% - in 1931 and 44% - in 1932

However, the overall acceleration of economic growth did not occur. On the contrary, it began to reduce growth rates in industry. The first five-year plan was not performed by the most important indicators: for the production of electricity, corner, oil, cast iron, mineral fertilizers, tractors, car masters. Instead of the estimated 103%, the actual growth was 60 - 70%.

Second five-year plan (1933 - 1937)

The second five-year plan (1933-1937), approved by the XVII CVP (b) congress (b) in early 1934, assumed the priority development of the heavy industry, the completion of the reconstruction of the national economy based on the latest technology. The planned tasks compared to the first five-year-old were moderate. 4.5 thousand enterprises were built, the accelerated pace developed the industry of the Union republics. There were powerful industrial centers and new industries: chemical, stankow, tractor and aircrafttener.

The development of the same light industry was sent very limited financial resources.

The second five-year plan was marked by a wide range of socialist competition. Stakhanovsky movement received widespread development. His initiator Alexey Stakhanov

in 1935, I installed the record, fulfilling the labor standards for replacing.
Economics conversion, socio-political and national Development USSR in the 1930s caused the need to adopt a new constitution. This happened on December 30, 1936. The main law of the country secured the official wording about the victory of socialism in the USSR.

The economy of the USSR in the late 30s. Third five-year plan

Development of the USSR at the end of the 30s. Defined tasks the third five-year plan (1938 - 1942). A political slogan was put forward - to catch up and overtake in terms of production per capita developed capitalist countries.

However, in practice, the advanced positions achieved in the metallurgical, chemical, engineering industry were combined with the lagging in the application of advanced technologies, in the issuance of public consumption items.

The main efforts in the third five-year plan were aimed at the development of industries that ensure the country's defense capability. The rates of their growth significantly exceeded the growth rate of the industry as a whole. By 1941, up to 43% of total investments were sent to these industries.

During the third five-year plan, special military economic events were carried out. In the Urals, in Siberia, Central Asia, the fuel and energy base developed accelerated pace. Of great importance was the creation " second Baku"- a new oil-producing area between Volga and the Urals.

Special attention was paid to the construction of aviation, tank and other defense factories, Transferring many enterprises of heavy and light industry on the production of military products. As a result, its volume increased dramatically, a massive release of rifle, artillery weapons and ammunition began. In the first months of war, an automatic small arms began to produce (Pistol-machine gun-packaging - PPSH) and the installation of reactive artillery BM-13 (Katyushi).

At the same time, the arms policy had lagging behind from the West and first of all from fascist Germany. This was determined by the continuing production of morally obsolete military equipment. The creation of modern types of weapons was delayed.

The main attention was paid now not quantitative indicators, and quality. The emphasis was made to increase the release of alloyed and high-quality steels, lungs and non-ferrous metals, accurate equipment. During the years of the five-year plan, serious measures were taken to develop the chemical industry and the chemical system of the national economy, the introduction of integrated mechanization, and even the first attempts to automate production were carried out. For three years (until 1941), production grew by 34%, which was close to planned indicators, although they were not achieved. In general, the pace of economic development was rather modest. It was felt that the gains were given to huge tension. The new technological level has increased the requirements for the balance of all units of the economy, to the quality of management and to employees themselves.

The political situation in Europe testified to the approach of war, so the third five-year plan has become a five-year-old preparation for war. This was expressed in the following.

First, instead of the giant enterprises, it was decided to build the average largest enterprise-duber in various parts of the country, but mainly in the eastern.

Secondly, military production increased accelerated pace. The average annual growth rates of military production according to official data were 39%.

Thirdly, many non-military enterprises received military orders and mastered the release of new products, crossed its production to the detriment of peaceful products. So, in 1939, the release of tanks increased 2 times, armored vehicles at 7.5 times compared with 1934, it was natural that it led to a reduction in the production of tractors, trucks and other peaceful products.

Construction of the third five-year plan

Fourth, new building, and for 1938-1941. About 3 thousand new major factories and factories were put into operation, was mainly in the east of the country - in the Urals, in Siberia, in Central Asia. These areas by 1941 began to play a prominent role in industrial production. In addition, during the years of the third five-year plan, the foundations of the industrial infrastructure were laid here, which allowed the most difficult first months of war to evacuate industrial enterprises from Western regions and in the shortest possible time to put them into operation, which would be simply impossible without existing industrial capacity there, railways, power lines, etc.

Features of the third five-year plan

The most important problem of the third five-year plan remained training of qualified personnel. The system of preparing workers in production through the network of courses and circles of technical studies has not yet fully satisfied the rapidly growing needs of industry in qualified personnel. Therefore, on October 2, 1940, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR creates a system for training government labor reserves. An annual reception of up to a million boys and girls in handicraft and railway schools, schools of FMU and their maintenance at the expense of the state were envisaged. After graduation, the state had the right to send young workers at his own discretion to any of the industries. Only in Moscow, 97 schools and schools FSU were open at 48,200 students and 77 craft schools with a two-year preparation.

Higher and secondary qualifications workers continued to prepare institutions and technical schools of the country. By January 1, 1941, 2401.2 thousand certified specialists were numbered in the USSR, which was 14 times the level of 1914 exceeded

And, nevertheless, despite undoubted successes in this area, the needs of the economy were not satisfied with the proper extent. Qualitative indicators left much to be desired. So, in 1939, only 8.2% of the workers had an education 7 classes and more, which had a negative effect on the rate of development of new techniques, on the growth of labor productivity, etc.

Approximately the same picture was in relation to ITR. By 1939, from 11-12 million employees only 2 million had a diploma of higher and secondary special education.

Discussions during the NEP

Import technology

Industrialization and cultural revolution

The origins of the first - Stalin's industrialization, plans of the Industrial Development Plans of the King Martyr Nicholas II

Collectivization - Industrialization of Agriculture

Mobilization economy or what means industrialization was conducted?

Where does the money on the industrialization?

About collectivization

On the role of industrialization in the victory in the Great Patriotic War

First - Stalin's Industrialization: The first five-year plan

First - Stalin's Industrialization: Second Five-Year Plan

Collectivization results

Results of the industrial development of the USSR in the postwar years

Stalin's nature conversion plan

Quotes I.V. Stalin about collectivization, about the need to collectivization

Quotes I.V. Stalin about collective farm construction

Quotes I.V. Stalin about industrialization

Quotes I.V. Stalin on collectivization results

• – The material and technical base of socialism.
• - Public property on the means of production - the basis of the production relations of socialism.
• - The main economic law of socialism.
• - Law of the systematic (proportional) development of the national economy
• - Public work in socialism.
• - Commodity Production, Law of Cost and Money for Socialism
• - Salary for socialism.
• - Economic calculation and profitability, cost price and price.
• - Socialist system of agriculture.
• - Commodity turnover in socialism.
• – National income of socialist society.
• – State budget, credit and money circulation under socialism.
• – Socialist reproduction.

Energy - the basis of the economy

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Coefficient in demand 3 382

First five-year plan - The first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR and the corresponding stage of the country's history from October 1, 1928 to September 30, 1933 inclusive. The first of the Stalinist five-year plans.

The main task is five-year plan

The main task of the 1st five-year period is formulated as "the creation of production facilities that make up the prerequisite for the construction of the foundation of the Socialist Economy." The historical experience of the industrialization of European countries with its initial accumulation of capital was unacceptable for the USSR due to the socialist nature of the state of workers and peasants. The economic blockade of the USSR on the part of world capital, the principal impossibility of obtaining "political" (i.e. not secured by the key) loans, imposed hard restrictions on an affordable resource base: had to rely only on their own forces, providing industrialization programs mainly by redistributing the most Possible volume of resources.

In December 1927, "Directives on the preparation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR" were adopted at the XV Congress of WCP (b). The congress spoke against "super-industrialization": growth rates should not be maximum, and they should be planned so that failures do not occur. The draft first five-year plan developed on the basis of these directives (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933) was approved at the XVI Conference of WCP (b) (April 1929), and in May of the same year, the V Congress of the Councils of the USSR was approved .

Financial system reforms

The 1st Five-Year Plan was different from all the following in the economy, and especially in finance, many institutions of the NEP period continued to operate. The banking system was decentralized - the industrialization program was served, in addition to the State Bank, Ceccombank (central communal), electrician, central Agriculturalbank, BDK (Bank of long-term lending to industry and agriculture), as well as cooperative banks, allocaby and Ukrainian.

In 1930, a credit reform was launched, which took 3 years (1930-32). In 1930, also conducted a tax reform.

Reform of the folk management system

The reform of the national economy management system was also carried out. The WEDD, created in 1917, after the formation of the USSR, had the status of the united pearlist. Even before the beginning of the five-year plan, in August 1926, the heads were created in its structure (Soc. Main Departments) by industry. In the course of the five-year plan, the number of enterprises began to grow rapidly, and there was a need to give large independence to the branch management bodies so that each of them could concentrate on solving the specific tasks of its industry.

To this end, on January 5, 1930, prototypes of ministries were created on the basis of the USSR - drug addicts (folk commissariates) of heavy, easy and forest industries. The apparatus and objectives of regional CHX (p.422) crossed, mainly by the appropriate executive committees of the Councils of Workers' Deputies. By the end of the 1930s. In the USSR there was 21 industrial addict. Thus, there was a transition to the sectoral principles of the industrial and centralization of the intersectoral distribution of raw materials and products.

Agriculture

The largest structural conversion of the economy in the 1st-five-year-old five-year plan was agriculture, launched in 1929. Already in March 1930, Stalin recognized the beggar in collective farm construction, after which a famous rollback occurred, and for August 1930, the collective farms united a little more than one fifth (21.4%) of peasant farms.

Nevertheless, the course for collectivization continued. Achievements of industrialization came to agriculture. Due to the lack of funds from the peasants to buy agricultural machinery, in 1929 the state organized machine-tractor stations (Soc. MTS). Comprehensive and funded by the budget, MTS provided their techniques to collective farms and state farms for rent. Taking on the remuneration of rural mechanisters, the state relatively increased funds due to cooperative peasants for distribution through workload. At the end of 1932, 2446 MTS was already operating in the USSR with a park of 73.3 thousand tractors.

Thanks to the emergence of a domestic tractor construction, in 1932, the USSR refused to enter tractors from abroad, and in 1934, the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began to release the wagon tractor "Universal", which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. For ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were issued, which amounted to 40% of their world production.

Achievements five-year plan

By 1930, the level of security of schools and personnel of teachers was reached, which made it possible to adopt the law "On Universal Mandatory Initial Learning". The cities introduced a mandatory seven-year education. Expanded system higher education, including technical and humanitarian.

In 1930, speaking at the XVI Congress of WCP (b), Stalin reported that the industrial breakthrough is possible and in the construction of socialism in one country.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. City workforce increased by 12.5 million people, of which 8.5 million were migrants from rural areas. However, the share of 50% of the USSR urban population was achieved only in the early 1960s.

Early completion of the five-year plan

The complex of reforms of the economic mechanism conducted in the USSR since 1928 gave the entire economy as a new quality planning object. The economy itself from agrarian-industrial turned into an industrial-agrarian (in 1932 the share of industry in national income reached 70.2%), and therefore the choice of the end of the agrarian year (September) as the points of reference plans became an anachronism.

To speed up the transition to the plans, consolidated on a qualitatively different structure of industries, to a new system of finance and loan, at the end of 1932, the work in the score of the 1st five-year plan was completed ahead of schedule. According to refined data, which I.V.Stalin reported on January 7, 1933, the United Plenum of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the CCC (b), for 4 years and 3 months of work in the account of the 1st five-year period The total industrial production program was made by 93.7% .

Revealing the hypothetical alternative, Stalin indicated that the regime of tuning to the rear plan of industrialization tasks would lead to the fact that "we would not have a tractor and automotive industry, black metallurgy, metal for the production of machines. The country would sit without bread. Capitalist elements in the country would incoverply would increase the chances of restoration of capitalism. Our situation would become similar to the situation of China, which then did not have its own heavy and military industry, and became an object of aggression. We would have with other countries are not non-propagation packages, but military intervention and war. The war is dangerous and fatal, the war is bloody and unequal, because in this war we would almost be unarmed in front of the enemies that are at their disposal all modern funds of the attack. "

By January 1, 1933, five-year tasks for the heavy industry were exceeded (105%). For 4 years and 3 months, the main production facilities of the heavy industry increased by 2.7 times. In coal, steel and cast iron, the increase was 1.8-1.9 times, and on the production of metal-cutting machines - by 9.9 times. Thus, the main task of the 1st five-year plan is the creation of production facilities that make up the background of building the foundation of the socialist economy - was recognized as fulfilled.